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INTRODUCTION 
 
Key Provisions 
 
1 - There are three key provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) that deal with religion. Article 9 provides the 
basic framework for freedom of religion1. Article 14 ensures that ECHR-
acknowledged rights should be free from religious discrimination2. 
Article 2 of the First Protocol gives parents the right to regulate the 
religious education of their children. The first and most central is 
Article 9. As in many international treaties, Article 9 of the European 
                                                          
  Contributo pubblicato per la cortese disponibilità della Cardozo Law Review (nella 
quale è apparso nel vol. n. 30:6 del 2009, alle pp. 2575-2591) e dell’Autrice. 
 
  The judgments and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
referred to in the text are available on the Court’s website, in the Hudoc database 
located at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/FR/hudoc. 
 
  This article reflects my personal view, and not that of the Court. 
 
 
 1 Eva Brems, The Approach of the European Court of Human Rights to Religion, in 
THILO MARAUHN, DIE RECHTSSTELLUNG DES MENSCHEN IM VÖLKERRECHT 1 (Mohr 
Siebeck 2003). 
 2 Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 2000, Europ. T.S. 177, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/177.htm, which contains a general non-
discrimination provision, could have a significant effect in Church-State relations. 
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 2 
Convention on Human Rights guarantees to everyone the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion3. This right implies, among 
others, freedom either alone or in community with others and in public 
or private, to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance; but this external expression of religion may be 
subjected under Article 9 § 2 to limitations prescribed by law and 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety and for 
the protection of public order, health, morals and the rights and 
freedoms of others4. As we see, there is a substantial dividing line 
between freedom of religion (internal conviction, inner sphere) and 
freedom to manifest one’s religion in the public sphere (the expression 
of that conviction). At the same time, freedom of religion has an 
individual as well as a collective aspect. 
 
 
An Indirect Regulation 
 
2 - As rightly pointed out by Carolyn Evans, the European Convention 
on Human Rights  
 
“does not deal directly with the relationship between [C]hurch 
and [S]tate in European countries (...). The ECHR does, however, 
indirectly regulate the permissible forms of relationship between 
religious institutions and the [S]tate by reference to religious 
freedom”5.  
 
In her paper, Evans compares  
 
“the strengths and weaknesses of a purely religious-freedom 
focused approach to the relationship between [C]hurch and 
                                                          
 3 Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom in European Human Rights Law: The Search for a 
Guiding Conception, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 385-86 (Mark W. Janis & 
Carolyn Evans, eds., 2004). 
 4 Article 9 does not belong to the provisions included in the second paragraph of 
Article 15 as non-derogable. On this point the Convention differs from the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, where in Article 4 § 2 the 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion laid down in Article 18 is declared non-
derogable. See CLARE OVEY & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, JACOBS & WHITE: THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 441 (4th ed. 2006). 
 5 Carolyn Evans & Christopher A. Thomas, Church-State Relations in the European 
Court of Human Rights, 2006 BYU L. REV. 699. See also Jean-Paul Jacqué, A propos de 
deux Aarêts de la Cour Suprême des Etats-Unis sur les relations entre l’Etat et la Religion, 
L’EUROPE DES LIBERTES, Sept. 2005, at 5, avalable at http://leuropedeslibertes.u-
strasbg.fr/article.php?id_article=1&id_rubrique=3. 
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 3 
[S]tate, as allowed by the ECHR, to that of the establishment-
oriented case law of countries such as the United States”6. 
 
 
The Court is Not a Constitutional Court 
 
3 - The European Court of Human Rights is the only European-level 
jurisdiction exclusively charged with adjudicating human rights 
complaints. Could it be regarded as assuming the role of a 
Constitutional Court of Europe? My answer is clearly no - but I will not 
discuss this issue here7. Nevertheless, as pointed out by J. Ringelheim, 
“analysis of the Court’s case law can shed an important light on the 
debate on religion and European constitutionalism”8. Why? Because the 
role of the Court (which is a supranational judicial body) is to “define 
common standards on religious freedom in a religiously diverse 
Europe”9, i.e., a Europe characterized by religious diversity. 
Furthermore, Conventional Europe today is the enlarged Europe of 47 
States - all countries of the continent, except Belarus and ... Vatican 
(which is not a democratic State but a theocratic one). As far as religion-
State relations are concerned, we are therefore faced in Europe with 
many different legal models: from one extreme (confusion of Church 
and State with a national Church in Great Britain, Denmark, Greece) to 
the other (complete or moderate separation of the Church from State 
under the concept of secularism in Turkey, of laïcité in France or 
neutrality in Belgium)10, all of them being highly ambiguous terms11. 
                                                          
 6 Evans & Thomas, supra note 5, at 701. 
 7 Cf. Nico Krisch, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law, 71 MOD. 
LAW REV. 183 (2008). 
 8 Julie Ringelheim, Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: The European Court of 
Human Rights in Search of a Theory?, in LAW, STATE AND RELIGION IN THE NEW EUROPE: 
DEBATES AND DILEMMAS (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2, on file with author).  
 9 Id. 
10  Leszek Lech Garlicki, Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the 
Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts, 2001 BYU L. REV. 467, 469. For more information, 
see JONATHAN FOX, A WORLD SURVEY OF RELIGION AND THE STATE (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
11  Cf. Eur. Parl. Ass., Colloquy on Questions related to State and Religion (Feb. 27, 
2007), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Conferences/2007ReligionPolitics/Summary.pdf; 
RENATA UITZ, FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Council of Europe 2007); RELIGION AND 
DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE (Gabriel Motzkin & Yochi Fischer, eds., 2008). 
See also Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law (Venice Comm’n), Comments on 
the Draft Law on Churches and Religious Organisations of the Republic of Serbia, Doc. No. 
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 4 
Nevertheless, in its Recommendation 1804 (2007) on State, Religion, 
Secularity and Human Rights, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe “reaffirms that one of Europe’s shared values, transcending 
national differences, is the separation of [C]hurch and [S]tate. This is a 
generally accepted principle that prevails in politics and institutions in 
democratic countries”12. 
 
 
Judicial Restraint 
 
4 - Quite often, the Court observes that “it is not possible to discern 
throughout Europe a uniform conception of the significance of religion 
in society; even within a single country such conceptions may vary”13. 
Accordingly, where questions concerning the relationship between 
State and religion are at stake, “on which opinion in a democratic 
society may reasonably differ widely”14, the role of national decision-
making bodies has to be given special consideration and domestic 
authorities should enjoy a large margin of appreciation. 
 
 
A Vision of Religious Freedom 
 
5 - Nevertheless, as pointed out by some commentators, “this attitude 
of judicial restraint is counterbalanced by an opposite tendency within 
the jurisprudence” and “the Court demonstrates an increasing 
willingness to go beyond the diversity of facts specific to each case and 
articulate general principles stemming from religious freedom ...”15. 
After a rather slow start, the Court has begun to fashion a concept of 
institutional freedom of religion free from unnecessary regulation by 
                                                                                                                                                         
379/2006 (June 13, 2006), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL-
AD(2006)024-e.pdf; Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law (Venice Comm’n), 
Comments on the Draft Law on Freedom of Religion, Religious Organisations and Mutual 
Relations with the State of Albania, Doc. No. 429/2007 (Nov. 30, 2007), available at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL(2007)107-e.asp. 
12  Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation 1804: State, Religion, Secularity and Human 
Rights, 27th Sess., Doc. No. 11298, at 1. 
13  Otto-Preminger-Inst. v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34, 57-58 
(1995).  
14  Şahin v. Turkey, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 101 (2005); see also Wingrove v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 20 (1996).  
15  Ringelheim, supra note 8, at 6-7.  
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 5 
the State16. So, despite contextual argumentation, the Court is trying to 
build “a consistent vision of religious freedom and of its implications 
for the relations between [S]tate and religions in a democratic society, 
valid across Europe”17. According to Alessandro Ferrari,  
 
“a common European law of religious freedom has been 
established, which is characterised by the primary position of the 
freedom of individual conscience, the autonomy of churches and 
by increasing cooperation between States and religious groups”18. 
 
 
Institutional Dimension of Religious Freedom 
 
6 - Finally, as rightly pointed out by Lech Garlicki,  
 
“[m]ost religions cannot be exercised in a proper manner if the 
believers are deprived of the possibility to act collectively. Thus, 
individual freedom of religion cannot be guaranteed unless there 
is a collateral guarantee for the freedom to found and to operate a 
church or other religious community”19.  
 
So the Court has been faced, quite often recently and under various 
forms, with this “collective aspect of religious freedom.” In this area, as 
we will see, Article 9 and Article 11 (freedom of association) are 
interrelated. 
 
7 - In this paper, I submit that if pluralism is the main model of the 
Court’s case-law related to freedom of religion and the core principle 
which organizes Church-State relations (I), it has also lately developed, 
in relation to recent sensitive issues, counter-models which could 
conflict with pluralism (II). Pluralism vs. Pluralism. 
 
 
                                                          
16  OVEY & WHITE, supra note 4, at 300. 
17  Ringelheim, supra note 8, at 3. See also Ingvill Thorson Plesner, The European 
Court on Human Rights Between Fundamentalist and Liberal Secularism, STRASBOURG 
CONSORTIUM, June 15, 2006, http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/essays/?p=12. 
18  Alessandro Ferrari, Religions, Secularity and Democracy in Europe: For a New 
Kelsenian Pact 5 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, The Jean Monnet Program, Working Paper No. 
03/05, available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/05/050301.pdf). 
19  Lech Garlicki, Collective Aspects of the Religious Freedoms: Recent Developments in 
the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in CENSORIAL SENSITIVITIES: FREE 
SPEECH AND RELIGION IN A FUNDAMENTALIST WORLD 218, 219 (Andras Sajo ed., 2007). 
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 6 
I. MODELS 
 
8 - The principle of pluralism seems to be the main, the core principle in 
this field:  
 
«[a]s enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within 
the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, 
one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of 
believers and of their conception of life, but it is also a precious 
asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The 
pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been 
dearly won over the centuries, depends on it»20.  
 
We find an echo of this in another context, concerning racial 
discrimination and hate crime.  
 
“[T]he authorities must use all available means to combat racism 
and racist violence, thereby reinforcing democracy’s vision of a 
society in which diversity is not perceived as a threat but as a 
source of its enrichment”21. 
 
9 - In other words, “[t]he Court constructs freedom of religion (also in 
its collective or/and institutional aspect) upon the whole system of 
values established by the Convention”22. Fundamentally, what does it 
mean? Diversity of beliefs or convictions is a common good for the 
whole society. The Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey case 
(concerning the freedom of association) is the one where the Court 
expresses the substance of its position regarding the relations between 
State and Church23. Freedom of conscience is a “precious asset” for the 
believers but also for the non-believers because it allows expression of 
one’s own identity. This freedom is one of the elements of pluralism, 
which is a part of democratic societies. Against this background, the 
State is a “neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various 
religions, faiths and beliefs” and its “role is conducive to public order, 
religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society”24. 
 
                                                          
20  Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 418 (1993).  
21  Nachova v. Bulgaria, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 933, 963 (2006).  
22  Garlicki, supra note 19, at 220-21.  
23  Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 33 (2003).  
24  Id. 
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 7 
10 - We see in the recent case-law of the Court the developments of the 
principle of pluralism going in two main directions25. 
 
 
No Arbitrary State Interference 
 
11 - As the Court ruled in Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria:  
 
“Where the organisation of the religious community is at issue, 
Article 9 of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of 
Article 11, which safeguards associative life against unjustified 
State interference. Seen in this perspective, the believers’ right to 
freedom of religion encompasses the expectation that the 
community will be allowed to function peacefully, free from 
arbitrary State intervention. Indeed, the autonomous existence of 
religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a 
democratic society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the 
protection which Article 9 affords”26.  
 
Moreover, the Court establishes a relation between the community and 
the individual: “[wh]ere the organisational life of the community is not 
protected by Article 9 of the Convention, all other aspects of the 
individual’s freedom of religion would become vulnerable”27. 
 
12 - There are numerous examples in various situations. In Svyato-
Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, the Court decided that the State cannot 
impose rules on admissions or exclusion of membership28. It follows 
that members of established religions must be allowed to freely choose 
to stay within or to leave that religion29. In the Holy Synod of the 
Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) v. Bulgaria, the 
applicants, who represent one of the two competing groups within the 
Orthodox Church, complained that by the Religious Denominations Act 
of 2002 and in the following years the Bulgarian Government forced the 
                                                          
25  On the permissible scope of State support for religion, see Evans & Thomas, 
supra note 5, at 713-15; E. & G.R. v. Austria, App. No. 9781/82, 37 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 42 (1984); Darby v. Sweden, App. No. 11581/85, 31 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 
& Rep. 1 (1989) (Commission report); X & Y v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9461/81, 31 
Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 210 (1982); Angeleni v. Sweden, App. No. 10491/83, 51 
Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 41 (1986).  
26  Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1339, 1359 (2000). 
27  Id.; see also Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 304 (2007). 
28  Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. 478.  
29  Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 409-10 (1993). 
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 8 
Orthodox community to reunite under the leadership of Patriarch 
Maxim and deprived the applicant organization (the rival leadership) of 
any control over part of the community’s affairs and property30. The 
Court found a violation of Article 9 of the Convention: indeed, neither 
the unity of the Church, even though it was a matter of the utmost 
importance for its adherents and for Bulgarian society in general, nor 
the Government’s purported aim of securing respect for the precepts of 
religious canon could justify State action imposing such unity by force 
and disregarding the position of numerous Christian Orthodox 
believers in Bulgaria who supported the applicant organization31. 
 
13 - A contrario, the refusal of the State to give official recognition to a 
Church with the consequence that its priests cannot officiate or its 
members cannot meet to practice their religion was found to constitute 
an interference in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova. 
Withholding legal recognition of a schismatic Church for reasons of 
religious unity must be regarded as a disproportionate restriction of 
religious freedom32. Moldova refused to recognize the Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia in circumstances where the only religions 
recognized by the Government may be practiced in Moldova. In finding 
a violation of Article 9, the Court took the opportunity to restate both 
the role of the State in the regulation of religious activities, and the 
relationship of the freedom protected by Article 9 with certain other 
freedoms. 
 
14 - In Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas v. Austria, the Court held 
that there had been a violation of Article 9 on account of Austrian 
authorities only having granted the Jehovah’s Witnesses religious 
community legal personality 20 years after their request and that, 
during that period, the Jehovah’s Witnesses had had no legal 
                                                          
30  Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) v. Bulgaria, 
App. No. 35677/04, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (locate the case by entering the 
application number).  
31  Id. at § 149, 155. 
32  Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 860, at §§ 129-
30. See also Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 912 (2006). 
In Lajda v. Czech Republic decision of March 3rd, 2009, the Court declared the 
application inadmissible precisely because the applicants could ask for a new 
registration according to a law that had been enacted, Lajda v. Czech Republic, App. No. 
20984/05, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en 
(locate the case by entering the application number) 
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 9 
personality in Austria33. The Court reiterated that the right of a 
religious community to an autonomous existence was indispensable for 
pluralism in a democratic society and thus it is at the very heart of the 
protection which Article 9 affords34. Even the creation of auxiliary 
associations with legal personality could not compensate for the 
authorities’ prolonged failure to grant legal personality. In addition: 
 
[O]ne of the means of exercising the right to manifest one’s 
religion, especially for a religious community in its collective 
dimension, is the possibility of ensuring judicial protection of the 
community, its members and its assets, so that Article 9 must be 
seen not only in the light of Article 11, but also in the light of 
Article 635. Given the importance of this right, the Court considers 
that there is an obligation on all of the State’s authorities to keep 
the time during which an applicant waits for conferment of legal 
personality for the purposes of Article 9 of the Convention 
reasonably short. The Court appreciates that during the waiting 
period the first applicant’s lack of legal personality could to some 
extent have been compensated by the creation of auxiliary 
associations which had legal personality, and it does not appear 
that the public authorities interfered with any such associations”36. 
 
 
State Neutrality and Impartiality 
 
15 - In many cases, the Court has repeatedly insisted on the fact that the 
role of the State must be “the neutral and impartial organiser of the 
exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs”37. Why? Because it is not 
the State’s role to determine whether religions or beliefs are legitimate. 
In this sense, as pointed out by Karl-Heinz Ladeur, “the [S]tate is 
principally neither allowed to favour nor to discriminate against certain 
professions of faith. This concept of equidistance is known as the 
                                                          
33  Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas v. Austria, App. No. 40825/98, 2008 Eur. 
Ct. H.R., http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (locate the case by 
entering the application number). 
34  Id. at § 61. 
35 Id. at § 63. 
36  Id. at § 79. 
37  Şahin v. Turkey, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 125 (2005); see also Hasan & Chaush v. 
Bulgaria, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1339, 1362-63 (2000); Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. 
Moldova, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 860, at § 116; Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, 46 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 304, 320-21 (2007). 
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principle of [S]tate neutrality (...). In this context, [S]tate neutrality 
merely functions as a chiffre for indifference”38. In Manoussakis v. Greece, 
the Court held that the freedom of religion “excludes any discretion on 
the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means 
used to express such beliefs are legitimate”39. 
 
16 - A contrario, as pointed out by Karen Reid: 
 
«[W]here a State has a bias to a particular religion (for example, 
constitutional protection) there is potential for issues arising as 
regards the effect of this preference on other religious groups. It is 
questionable to what extent in multi-ethnic Europe one group can 
justifiably be given preferential treatment over another and what 
weight should be given to the history and traditions of the 
particular country. The arrival on the scene of other “religions” 
with differing cultural and social dimensions, poses special 
problems where practices conflict with expected ways of doing 
things»40. 
 
17 - From this principle of neutrality and impartiality flows that the 
State should not take sides in religious conflicts within and between 
religious communities. For instance, refusal of legal recognition of a 
schismatic church for reasons of religious unity must be regarded as a 
restriction of religious freedom41. Likewise, State action favoring one 
leader or group of a divided religious community, or undertaken with 
the purpose of forcing the community to come together under a single 
leadership against its own wishes would likewise constitute an 
interference with the freedom of religion42. The Court observed also 
that tensions between competing religious groups was an unavoidable 
consequence of pluralism but that the role of the authorities in such a 
                                                          
38 Karl-Heinz Ladeur & Ino Augsberg, The Myth of the Neutral State: The 
Relationship Between State and Religion in the Face of New Challenges, 8 GERMAN L.J. 143, 
143-44 (2007) (emphasis in the original), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol08No02/PDF_Vol_08_No_02_143-
152_Articles_Augsberg_Ladeur.pdf. 
39  Manoussakis v. Greece, App. No. 18748/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, 400-01 (1996). 
40  Karen REID, A PRACTICTIONER’S GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 514 (3rd ed., 2008). 
41  Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at § 105. 
42  Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 561, 572-73 (1999); Hasan & 
Chaush, at 1362-63; Supreme Holy Council of Muslim Cmty. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 
39023/97, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 23, 37-40 (2004). 
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situation is not to remove the cause of the tensions by eliminating 
pluralism, but, instead, to ensure that the competing groups, rival 
factions, tolerate each other43. They may act as mediator between 
religious groups and endeavor to ensure pacific relations44. Public 
authority should indeed foster religious harmony and tolerance in a 
democratic society45. 
 
18 - In Verein der Freunde der Christengemeinschaft v. Austria: 
 
“[t]he applicants complained that the Austrian authorities had 
refused to grant the first applicant legal personality in the form of 
a religious society under the 1874 Recognition Act, whereby it 
would have acquired the status of a public-law entity, and had 
merely granted it legal personality as a publicly registered 
religious community under the 1998 Religious Communities Act, 
thereby conferring on it the inferior status of an entity under 
private law”46. 
 
In this case, “the Federal Minister’s refusal to recognise the applicant as 
a religious society was based on the same ground  - non-fulfilment of 
the ten-year waiting period” -  as in the case of Religionsgemeinschaft der 
Zeugen Jehovas v. Austria47. The Court further observed: 
 
“[T]he Government, in their own submissions, acknowledged the 
applicant’s existence in Austria in the form of an association from 
24 August 1945 onwards. Thus, it can hardly be seen as a newly 
established and unknown religious group but rather as one which 
is long established in the country and therefore familiar to the 
competent authorities. For such a religious group a ten year 
waiting period is not justified”48. «This being so, the Court must 
arrive at the same conclusion as in the case of Religionsgemeinschaft 
der Zeugen Jehovas and Others, namely that the difference in 
treatment was not based on any “objective and reasonable 
                                                          
43  See Ouranio Toxo v. Greece, App. No. 74989/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277, 285 (2005); 
Serif v. Greece, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 573. 
44  Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Cmty., 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 38.  
45  97 Members of Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Georgia, App. No. 
71156/01, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 613, 646 (2007). 
46  Verein der Freunde der Christengemeinschaft v. Austria, App. No. 76581/01, 2009 
Eur. Ct. H.R., at § 38, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (locate 
the case by entering the application number). 
47  Id. at § 44. 
48  Id.  
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justification”. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 14 
of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 9»49. 
 
19 - Which are the main implications of this neutrality obligation as to 
the conformity with the Convention of the various legal regimes 
governing relations between State and religion in European countries? 
There are three. 
 
20 - Firstly, different systems can be compatible with religious freedom: 
so a State Church is not per se incompatible with Article 9 if there are 
specific safeguards for the individual’s freedom of religion50. Some 
recent cases attest a stricter attitude on the part of the Court in respect 
to official or dominant church systems. In Folgerø v. Norway, the Court 
holds with a tight majority of nine to eight that Norway’s refusal to 
grant the applicants’ children a full exemption from the subject in 
Christianity, Religion and Philosophy at primary school, entails a 
violation of the obligation to respect parents’ religious and 
philosophical convictions when assuming education and teaching 
function (Article 2 of the first Protocol to the Convention)51. Whilst this 
subject is described in the law as designed to transmit knowledge about 
Christianity and other world religions in a spirit of intercultural 
dialogue, the Court highlights that in fact the curriculum is 
characterized by a significant preponderance of Christianity, and more 
especially of the Evangelical-Lutheran faith, i.e. Norway’s official 
religion. 
 
21 - In Alexandridis v. Greece, the Court expresses criticism at the Greek 
Orthodox Church’s privileged position in public institutions52. The fact 
that lawyers’ professional oath, required to be entitled to practice law, 
has to be taken normally on the Gospels, and that those willing to opt 
for a “solemn declaration” instead have to reveal their religious 
affiliation, is found to be in breach of freedom of religion. Importantly, 
what the Court mainly criticizes, is that the procedure at stake relies on 
                                                          
49  Id. at § 45. 
50  For the historical reasons thereof, see Evans & Thomas, supra note 5, at 706. 
51 Folgerø v. Norway, App. No. 15472/02, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1147, 1187-88 (2007). 
52  Alexandridis v. Greece, App. No. 19516/06, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R., at § 38, 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (locate the case by entering the 
application number). The Court specifies that the right to religious freedom includes 
the right not to manifest one’s religious convictions. In this regard, see also the Court’s 
observations in Folgerø v. Norway, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1191-92. 
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the assumption that every lawyer in Greece is a Christian Orthodox and 
wishes to take the religious oath53. 
 
22 - Secondly, public authorities are under no obligation to provide an 
identical legal status to each community54. Nevertheless, the Court will 
control with severity the conformity with the Convention of advantages 
granted exclusively to one religious community. Any advantage 
conferred to a religious community to the exclusion of the others must 
rest on a legitimate justification and remain proportionate55. 
 
23 - In Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas v. Austria, the Court 
observed “that under Austrian law religious societies enjoyed 
privileged treatment in many areas,” notably taxation56. In view of 
those privileges, it was up to the authorities to remain neutral and to 
give all religious groups a fair opportunity to apply for a specific status, 
using established criteria in a non-discriminatory manner57. That duty 
to remain neutral and impartial also raised delicate questions when 
imposing a qualifying period on a religious association which had legal 
personality before it could obtain a more consolidated status as a 
public-law body. The Court accepted that making a religious 
community wait for ten years before granting it the status of a religious 
society could be necessary in exceptional circumstances, such as in the 
case of newly established and unknown religious groups. However, it 
hardly appeared justified with respect to religious groups that were 
well-established both nationally and internationally and therefore 
familiar to the relevant authorities, as was the case with the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. In the case of such religious group, the authorities should 
have been able to verify within a considerably shorter period whether 
the requirements of the relevant legislation had been fulfilled. Indeed, 
                                                          
53  Alexandridis, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. at § 36. In Vergos v. Greece, App. No. 65501/01, 41 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 913, 921 (2004), a system of prior authorization (e.g. to build a church) 
depending on the authorization by a recognized ecclesiastical authority of the 
dominant religion is irreconcilable with Article 9 § 2. 
54  The Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, App. No. 25528/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 521, 
534 (1997).  
55  See Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek v. France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., where alleged 
discrimination between two Jewish associations was at stake. 
56  Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas v. Austria, App. No. 40825/98, 2008 Eur. 
Ct. H.R., at § 92, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (locate the 
case by entering the application number). 
57 Id. 
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the Court noted the example submitted by the applicants of The Coptic 
Orthodox Church which had been recognized in 2003 as a religious 
society although, having been established in Austria since 1976, it had 
only been registered as a religious community in 1998. In contrast, the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses had existed in Austria for considerably longer but 
still only had the status of a religious community. That showed that 
Austria did not consider it essential for its policy in the field to apply 
the same ten-year qualifying period to all. Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that that difference in treatment had not been based on any 
“objective and reasonable justification,” in violation of Article 14 taken 
in conjunction with Article 958. 
 
24 - In this respect, we could also mention Hasan & Eylem Zengin v. 
Turkey, where the Court found a violation of Article 2 of the First 
Protocol where in a public school the applicants’ children, belonging to 
the Alevis confession, were obliged to follow obligatory lessons in 
morals and religious culture. The State cannot express any preference 
for a specific religion or belief59. 
 
25 - Finally, neutrality does not have to be equivalent to indifference. 
Positive obligations may arise requiring the State to take steps to protect 
the exercise of religious freedom from others. A violation of Article 9 
arose where the authorities failed to take any steps against a fanatical 
group that had attacked a congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
assaulting them and burning books. The Court stated that the State was 
under an obligation to ensure that the group of orthodox extremists 
tolerated the applicants and allowed them freely to manifest their 
religion60. 
 
26 - Before moving to my second part, I would like to make a last 
comment. Very often, pluralism entails a problem of conflicting human 
rights61, which demands a serious and contextual examination. The 
                                                          
58  Id. at §§ 97-99; see also Verein der Freunde der Christengemeinschaft v. Austria, App. 
No. 76581/01, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., at §§ 44, 45, 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (locate the case by entering the 
application number). 
59  Hasan & Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, App. No. 1448/04, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1060, 1077 
(2007).  
60  97 Members of Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Georgia, App. No. 
71156/01, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 613, 645-46. 
61  See Olivier De Schutter & Francoise Tulkens, Rights in Conflict: The European 
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conflict can be described as one between, on the one hand, the 
accommodation of religious freedom claims, and on the other hand, 
individual liberties and fundamental rights of others, such as for 
example the right to be treated equally62. 
 
 
II. COUNTER-MODELS 
 
27 - While most would agree with the Court’s view, expressed in Serif v. 
Greece that in circumstances of religious tension governments should 
work to promote pluralism and  
 
“ensure tolerance between the rival factions, it may frequently be 
the case that allowing one person complete freedom to manifest 
his religion or belief would be to impinge  - sometimes with 
dangerous consequences -  on the rights of others. It would 
therefore perhaps be understandable if, in certain cases, the Court 
were to allow a wide margin of appreciation to place restrictions of 
the freedom to manifest religion or belief”63. 
 
However, some argue “that the Court has demonstrated a certain 
lack of empathy for the believer, and has appeared only to pay lip-
service to the commitment to religious freedom proclaimed (...)”64. 
Others are going further and submit that (especially) “when faced 
with contestations touching upon the issue of expression of 
religion in the public sphere,” 
 
the Court have adopted stances that are questionable from the 
viewpoint of the principles it has itself identified as central for religious 
freedom, first and foremost, the protection of pluralism65. 
 
28 - In the caselaw of the Court today, I also observe that the main 
limitations to the right of religious freedom (and also the freedom of 
thought or conscience) are motivated by the need to protect democratic 
                                                                                                                                                         
Court of Human Rights as a Pragmatic Institution, in CONFLICTS BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS 169 (Eva Brems, ed. 2008). 
62  On the conflict between an individual exercise of religious freedom and the 
protection of gender equality, see Titia Loenen, Freedom of Religion Versus Sex Equality 
and State Neutrality: The Difference the Method of Review Can Make, in CONFLICTS 
BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 421 (Eva Brems, ed. 2008). 
63  OVEY & WHITE, supra note 4, at 316.  
64  Id. 
65  Ringelheim, supra note 8, at 16. 
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societies from the danger of Islam and sects. 
 
 
Islam 
 
29 - The examination of the merits of Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v. 
Turkey case did not occur in reference to religious freedom (Art. 9 of 
ECHR) or the right of members of minority groups to live according to 
their own traditions (Art. 8 of ECHR), but within the framework of the 
freedom of assembly and association (guaranteed by Art. 11 of ECHR). 
In its Grand Chamber judgment of February 13th, 2003, the Court 
found that there was no violation of the applicants’ freedom of 
association: that is to say there was certainly an interference with the 
freedom of association (dissolution of a political party which at that 
time was the governing party by means of free and democratic 
elections), but the dissolution was found legitimate according to the 
second paragraph of Article 11. The Court decided that “[t]aking into 
account the importance of the principle of secularism for the democratic 
system in Turkey,” the dissolution pursued several of the following 
legitimate aims: “protection of national security and public safety, 
prevention of disorder or crime and protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”66. Two of the key rights that the dissolution was 
supposed to protect were those of freedom of religion and belief and 
non-discrimination on the basis of religion. The reasoning that the 
dissolution was “necessary in a democratic society” is particularly 
relevant, because the Court held that the Refah Party’s plan to 
introduce legal pluralism and the sharia were contradictory with the 
“fundamental democratic principles”: 
 
“Like the Constitutional Court, the Court considers that sharia, 
which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by 
religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as pluralism in 
the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms 
have no place in it. The Court notes that, when read together, the 
offending statements, which contain explicit references to the 
introduction of sharia, are difficult to reconcile with the 
fundamental principles of democracy, as conceived in the 
Convention taken as a whole. It is difficult to declare one’s respect 
for democracy and human rights while at the same time 
supporting a regime based on sharia, which clearly diverges from 
Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law 
                                                          
66 Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 28 (2003). 
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and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and 
the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in 
accordance with religious precepts (...). In the Court’s view, a 
political party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing 
sharia in a State party to the Convention can hardly be regarded as 
an association complying with the democratic ideal that underlies 
the whole of the Convention”67. 
 
30 - In fact, as pointed out by Karen Meerschaut and Serge Gutwirth, 
«the Refah judgment implies a radical denial of any legal pluralism that 
pursues the accommodation of Islamic law and human rights: it leaves 
no place / space for “compatibilisation” of different legal traditions»68. 
 
 
Sects 
 
31 - I will refer here to the case of Leela Förderkreis E.V. v. Germany. The 
applicants, all associations registered under German law in the 1960s 
and 70s, are religious associations or meditation associations belonging 
to the Osho movement, formerly known as the Shree Rajneesh or 
Bhagwan movement. In 1979, State agencies have issued warnings 
against movements including that of the applicants, and the German 
Government launched an information campaign in which it referred to 
the applicants’ associations as “sects,” “youth sects,” “youth religions” 
and “psycho-sects”. The focus of concern was the potential danger that 
these groups could represent for adolescents’ personal development 
and social relations, leading to their dropping out of school and 
vocational training, radical changes in personality, individual forms of 
dependence, lack of initiative and difficulties of communication, often 
aggravated by the group structure characteristic of certain 
communities, but also to material losses and psychological harm. In 
October 1984 the applicants, claiming to be part of an authentic 
religious movement, brought proceedings against the Government in 
the administrative courts. Judgments were given by the Cologne 
Administrative Court (January 1986), the Administrative Court of 
Appeal of North Rhine-Westphalia (May 1990) and the Federal 
Administrative Court (March 1991). The applicants lodged a 
constitutional appeal with the Federal Constitutional Court in May 
                                                          
67  Id. at 44. 
68  Karen Meerschaut & Serge Gutwirth, Legal Pluralism and Islam in the Scales of 
the European Court of Human Rights: The limits of Categorical Balancing, in CONFLICTS 
BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 431, 439 (Eva Brems, ed. 2008). 
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1992, which on June 26th, 2002 gave judgment upholding the 
applicants’ appeal in part but holding for the remainder that the 
Government were entitled to refer to the applicants’ movement as 
“sect,” “youth sect,” “youth religion” and “psycho sect” because these 
impugned terms correspond to the general understanding of new 
religious movements and did not have defamatory connotations. 
 
32 - The applicants associations complained that the Government’s 
information campaign constituted an unjustified interference with their 
right to manifest their religion as provided in Article 9 of the 
Convention. In particular, the associations are of the view that the 
information campaign used to describe their movement demonstrated a 
failure by the Government to remain neutral in the exercise of their 
powers69. The Helsinki Foundation, which presented a written third 
party submission, observed that the labeling of religious groups as 
“sects” or “cults” was widespread in Poland and other European 
countries. “They considered that the term “sect” had an unclear 
meaning and a clearly negative connotation and should be regarded as 
defamatory when used by public officials”70. 
 
33 - In its assessment, the Court deems that “[t]he State had to observe 
neutrality in religious or philosophical matters and was forbidden from 
depicting a religious or philosophical group in a defamatory or 
distorted manner”71. So, it accepts there was interference. But, as to the 
legitimate aim: 
 
“The Court observes that the purpose of the Government’s 
warnings was to provide information capable of contributing to a 
debate in a democratic society on matters of major public concern 
at the relevant time and to draw attention to the dangers 
emanating from groups which were commonly referred to as sects. 
Considering also the terms in which the decision of the Federal 
Constitutional Court was phrased, the Court considers that the 
interference with the applicant associations’ right was in pursuit of 
legitimate aims under Article 9 § 2, namely the protection of public 
safety and public order and the protection of the rights and 
                                                          
69  Leela Förderkreis E.V. v. Germany, App. No. 58911/00, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R., at § 83, 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (locate the case by entering the 
application number). 
70  Id. at § 78. 
71  Id. at § 90. 
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freedoms of others”72. 
 
Finally, as far as the necessity test is concerned,  
 
“the Court has to weigh up the conflicting interests of the exercise 
of the right of the applicant associations to proper respect for their 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the duty of the 
national authorities to impart to the public information on matters 
of general concern”73. 
 
Balancing these competing interests, the Court continued: 
 
“Having regard not only to the particular circumstances of the 
case but also to its background, the Court notes that at the material 
time the increasing number of new religious and ideological 
movements generated conflict and tension in German society, 
raising questions of general importance. The contested statements 
and the other material before the Court show that the German 
Government, by providing people in good time with explanations 
it considered useful at that time, was aiming to settle a burning 
public issue and attempting to warn citizens against phenomena it 
viewed as disturbing, for example, the appearance of numerous 
new religious movements and their attraction for young people. 
The public authorities wished to enable people, if necessary, to 
take care of themselves and not to land themselves or others in 
difficulties solely on account of lack of knowledge”74. Furthermore, 
“[t]he Court takes the view that such a power of preventive 
intervention on the State’s part is also consistent with the 
Contracting Parties’ positive obligations under Article 1 of the 
Convention to secure the rights and freedoms of persons within 
their jurisdiction. Those obligations relate not only to any 
interference that may result from acts or omissions imputable to 
agents of the State or occurring in public establishments, but also 
to interference imputable to private individuals within non-State 
entities”75.  
 
The Court concluded by observing that the 
 
«Federal Constitutional Court, in its decision given on 26 June 
2002, carefully analysed the impugned statements and prohibited 
the use of the adjectives “estructive” and “pseudo-religious” and 
                                                          
72  Id. at § 94. 
73  Id. at § 96. 
74  Id. at § 98. 
75  Id. at § 99 (emphasis added). 
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the allegation that members of the movement were manipulated as 
infringing the principle of religious neutrality. The remaining 
terms, notably the naming of the applicant associations’ groups as 
“sects”, “youth sects” or “psycho-sects”, even if they had a 
pejorative note, were used at the material time quite 
indiscriminately for any kind of non-mainstream religion. The 
Court further notes that the Government undisputedly refrained 
from further using the term “sect” in their information campaign 
following the recommendation contained in the expert report on 
“so-called sects and psycho-cults” issued in 1998 (...). Under these 
circumstances, the Court considers that the Government’s 
statements as delimited by the Federal Constitutional Court, at 
least at the time they were made, did not entail overstepping the 
bounds of what a democratic State may regard as the public 
interest»76. “In the light of the foregoing and having regard to the 
margin of appreciation left to the national authorities, whose duty 
it is in a democratic society also to consider, within the limits of 
their jurisdiction, the interests of society as a whole, the Court 
finds that the interference in issue was justified in principle and 
proportionate to the aim pursued. There has accordingly been no 
violation of Article 9 of the Convention”77. 
 
Personally, I fail to see the active role of the State in a pluralistic society 
as a participant in the public discussion of beliefs. This last decision of 
the Court seems to me far from Kokkinakis, one of the firsts. 
                                                          
76  Id. at § 100. 
77  Id. at § 101. 
